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NOTES AND COMMENT

in its opinion cited a Washington case1 where it was held that when a
complaint for divorce by a husband alleged his residence within the state,
the wife, who appeared and procured a decree in her favor, could not
afterwards attack such decree on the ground that the husband was a
nonresident. Neither could she attack the decree on the ground that
the husband misrepresented the amount of his property
when she had
2
had ample means of ascertaining the correct amount.
In general it may be said, that courts will not countenance an attack
by either party upon a decree obtained by collusion. In the first place
it is a direct fraud upon the sanctity of the court; and secondly, it is
maliciously antagonistic to sound public policy. "Friendly Contests"
in courts of justice, where ostensible suits are commenced and fraudulent
decrees obtained are not looked upon favorably by the courts when the
actual facts become known.
JoHN B. BENNETT.
Fixtures: Portable garage not a part of realty and a tenant's
failure to remove same on surrender of premises is not a forfeiture
of right.-Before the reign of Henry the VI, common law courts
gave very little consideration to personal property and hence, the law in
relation to such property has largely developed since that time. Along
with that development, there arose questions as to what was and what
was not personal property. From cases involving this question, the
courts have built up the law of fixtures. Some of the greatest text
writers have been at a loss to define the term "fixtures," but the following appears to be the most lucid definition: "Things associated with
and more or less incidental to the occupation of lands or houses or either
thereof and with regard to which the question most frequently arising
is of their removeability by the persons claiming them.,
In the case of Hanson v. Ryan, 201 N. W. 749 (Wis.), the subject
of fixtures was treated very ably. The plaintiff alleged that he was the
owner of "one portable, moveable, and collapsible garage made of wood
and valued at $2oo," the suit being for its immediate possession. The
plaintiff had been in the habit of renting portable garages to tenants
throughout the city. These garages contained no floor and merely
rested upon the ground. The plaintiff rented a garage to one Dawson,
who was a tenant of the defendant. Dawson moved from tlie premises
and at the time of his removal, was in default in his rent. The defendant sued for the rent and recovered a judgment, levying on the
garage, which the tenant had failed to remove. The plaintiff claimed
that the garage was personal property and that the defendant landlord
had loft his interest in it by his execution thereon.
The question therefore was whether this portable garage was a fixture
'Ferry v. Ferry, 37 Pac. 431 (Wash.).

'Other citations upon that point are Ellis v. White, 17 N.W. 281 (Iowa)
Mohler v. Shank, 61 N.W. 981 (Iowa); Carren v. Carren, 69 Pac. 465 (Utah);
Bankroft v. Bankroft, 173 Pac. 579 (Cal.).
Reeves on Real Property, Sec. io, page 14.
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or personal property. If it was a fixture, the plaintiff could not have
obtained possession of it. If it was personal property, the plaintiff had
complete title and it could not be subject to execution by the defendant.
In deciding this question in favor of the plaintiff, the court expounded
the following propositions:
(I) The rule governing fixtures is not as strict in regard to landlord
and tenant as between grantor and grantee, and mortgagor and mortgagee, where the removal of the article will not injure the land.
(2)
The tenant's failure to remove the garage at the time of surrendering his lease did not preclude the owner from removing the
structure since there was no intention to annex it permanently to the
land.
(3) The landlord was not a purchaser for value, without notice so
as to cause a forfeiture of the right to remove after the surrender of
the demised premises.
Considering the first proposition, the older cases decided that of necessity, there would have to be some relaxation from the strictness of the
rule governing fixtures. Thus, in the Poole case, 2 the court ruled that
on the tenant's removal or surrender of a lease, he could take with him
all his utensils of trade. From this case, the courts excepted trade
fixtures. In Baringer v. Evenson,3 the court by way of dictum, said
that it is the aim of courts to encourage tenants to improve the property
for their own convenience and their right to remove should not be taken
from them. Coincident with the establishment of the doctrine of trade
fixtures, a similar doctrine arose in regard to domestic fixtures with
reference to stoves, chairs, etc., which a tenant could remove. Consequently, the relationship between landlord and tenant involving transmutation of possession deserves a relaxation from the rules when applied
to grantor and grantee. The same rules could not be applied and still
render justice to all the parties. In the light of the foregoing discussion,
the lower court erred in finding that a portable garage, not attached to
the land, could be considered as a part of the realty. It can readily be
seen that a building of this nature could easily be removed without any
permanent injury to the land itself.
The next consideration has long been a source of trouble to the courts
of both this country and England: viz., does a tenant's failure to remove what he has added to the premises before his surrender of the
lease forfeit his right to remove it afterwards? Generally, courts have
based their findings on the intention of the annexer. What was the
intention in the present case? In Baringer v. Evenson, supra,the court
held that there must be a physical annexation to the realty, an adaption
for the purpose to which the realty is used and an intention on the part
of the annexer to make a permanent improvement. All these elements
are lacking in the present case. The court therefore arrives at a very
sensible conclusion in holding that the garage could be removed after a
surrender by the tenant.
'I Salk 268.
3127 Wis. 36, io6 N.W. 8oi.
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In regard to the third proposition, the landlord could not be considered a purchaser for value and without notice so that he could say
that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting his right to the possession
of the garage.4
E. J. B.
Injunction: Police officers not enjoined from searching premises
for intoxicating liquors; remedy at law adequate.-In Joyner v.
Hammond, 2oo N. W. 571 (Iowa), the court ruled that an injunction
would not issue to enjoin the chief of police and his officers from searching the plaintiff's place of business for illegal liquor kept for sale. The
plaintiff's premises had previously been searched several times and the
plaintiff had grounds to believe they would be searched again and his
business and property injured. He alleged that the former search warrants were issued upon mere suspicion. The plaintiff had brought no
action for damages because of the previous searches and the opinion
fails to discuss the findings as to whether the warrants were issued
upon mere suspicion or upon probable cause. The court based its decision on the ground: first, that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy
at law and second, that "an injunction will not lie to hamper and thwart
the power and discretion of the police touching the performance of
duties enjoined upon them by law." In other words, the court decided
that an injunction will never issue to enjoin the police from searching
one's premises under the statutory form of warrant, regardless of
whether the warrant was issued upon mere suspicion or probable cause
as the statute requires.
The court based its decision that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy
at law on a number of cases and citations. None of them are cases or
discuss cases precisely on all fours with this one but all discuss the
principles applicable when it is sought to enjoin police officers from
making arrests, and from interfering with private business in the exercise of their duties. A discussion of these cases individually would
require too much space. The following are the most important rules
laid down in them. Police officers cannot be enjoined from performing
their duties of keeping the peace and seeing that the laws are obeyed.
Where the actions of the police are necessary in the suppression of an
unlawful business they cannot be enjoined because of incidental injury
to a private individual.' Equity will not enjoin police officials from
stationing officers near a place where liquor is sold, to warn intending
patrons that the place is disorderly and subject to raid, since, assuming
that the acts are illegal, if the assumption of fact is erroneous, that fact
must be established by law in an action for damages.2 Corpus Juris
states the rule as follows: "Police officers will not be enjoined from
performing their proper duties in the exercise of the general police
'Accord: Walker-v. Grand Rapids Flouring Mill Co., 70 Wis. 92, 35 N.W.
332;
1 Wolf v. Klutch, 147 Wis. 209, 132 N.W. 98r.
Mart v. Grinnell, 194 Iowa 499, 187 N.W. 471, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 678.
'Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 2o9.

